Cybersecurity
The threat analysis: assets, threats, attack paths and security goals.
On this page: asset · damage-scenario · threat · attack-path · security-goal
A threat analysis and risk assessment (ISO/SAE 21434): assets, damage scenarios, threats and attack paths (rated, checked and typeset by archec — archec tara), and security goals (Arche requirements of category security).
asset#
A cybersecurity asset (ISO/SAE 21434 TARA): something worth protecting — a message, a function, a key, the data of a part — and the properties of it an attack can break. Checked and typeset by archec (archec tara); Arche has no place for it yet.
- Keywords:
asset - Set: safety, security & design space
- Where: top level
- Syntax:
asset Id "What" { of element; properties integrity, availability }
| Property | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
description |
text | Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX. |
of |
element name | The element (part, port, link, message…) it is. |
properties |
refs | The cybersecurity properties at stake. |
tags |
list of tag names | Tags. |
asset AS-BRAKE "Brake commands" { of Car.adcu.can_brake; properties integrity, availability }
damage-scenario#
A damage scenario: what happens to the road user when a property of an asset is broken, rated by impact category (severe, major, moderate, negligible). Its impact is the worst of its ratings.
- Keywords:
damage-scenario - Set: safety, security & design space
- Where: top level
- Syntax:
damage-scenario Id "What happens" { asset AS-…; property integrity; safety severe; financial …; operational …; privacy … }
| Property | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
description |
text | Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX. |
asset |
asset name | The asset harmed. |
property |
confidentiality | integrity | availability | authenticity | authorization | non-repudiation |
The property broken. |
safety |
severe | major | moderate | negligible |
Impact on safety. |
financial |
severe | major | moderate | negligible |
Financial impact. |
operational |
severe | major | moderate | negligible |
Operational impact. |
privacy |
severe | major | moderate | negligible |
Impact on privacy. |
damage-scenario DS-BRAKE "Unintended full braking on the motorway" { asset AS-BRAKE; property integrity; safety severe; operational major }
threat#
A threat scenario: how an attacker brings a damage scenario about, through which entry point and from how far (vector). Its risk (1–5) comes from the impact of what it damages and the feasibility of its easiest attack path; its CAL from the impact and the vector. A risk of 4 or 5 needs a treatment, and reduce a security goal.
- Keywords:
threat - Set: safety, security & design space
- Where: top level
- Syntax:
threat Id "How" { damages DS-…; stride spoofing; via element; vector network; treatment reduce; goal CSG-… }
| Property | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
description |
text | Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX. |
damages |
list of damage scenario names | The damage scenarios it leads to. |
stride |
spoofing | tampering | repudiation | disclosure | denial | elevation |
Its STRIDE category. |
via |
element name | The entry point: the element the attack goes through. |
vector |
network | adjacent | local | physical |
From how far: network (remote), adjacent (radio, a shared bus), local (a port on the car), physical (hands on the part). |
treatment |
reduce | avoid | share | retain |
What is done with the risk: reduce (security goals), avoid (remove what makes it possible), share (contract, insurance) or retain (a claim says why). |
goal |
list of requirement names | The security goals that reduce it. |
claim |
text | Why a retained or shared risk is acceptable. |
threat TS-SPOOF "Spoofed brake commands on the chassis CAN" {
damages DS-BRAKE
stride spoofing
via Car.chassis_can
vector adjacent
treatment reduce
goal CSG-01
}
attack-path#
An attack path: the steps an attacker takes to carry a threat out, rated for attack potential (ISO/SAE 21434 annex G): elapsed time, expertise, knowledge of the item, window of opportunity and equipment. The points add up to the feasibility: 0–9 high, 10–13 medium, 14–19 low, 20 and more very low.
- Keywords:
attack-path - Set: safety, security & design space
- Where: top level
- Syntax:
attack-path Id "How" { threat TS-…; step "…"; elapsed week; expertise proficient; knowledge restricted; window easy; equipment specialized }
| Property | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
description |
text | Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX. |
threat |
threat name | The threat it carries out. |
step |
text | One step of the attack (repeatable). |
elapsed |
day | week | month | half-year | beyond |
Time it takes: day (≤ 1 day), week, month, half-year (≤ 6 months), beyond. |
expertise |
layman | proficient | expert | multiple-experts |
Expertise it needs. |
knowledge |
public | restricted | confidential | strict |
Knowledge of the item it needs. |
window |
unlimited | easy | moderate | difficult |
Window of opportunity. |
equipment |
standard | specialized | bespoke | multiple-bespoke |
Equipment it needs. |
attack-path AP-OBD "Frames injected from the diagnostic port" {
threat TS-SPOOF
step "Plug a CAN adapter into the OBD port"
step "Replay a captured BRAKE_CMD"
elapsed week
expertise proficient
knowledge restricted
window moderate
equipment standard
}
security-goal#
A cybersecurity goal: the top-level security requirement answering threats, with its CAL (cybersecurity assurance level, CAL1–CAL4; derived from its threats when not written, and one written lower is reported). Written to Arche as a requirement of category security.
- Keywords:
security-goal - Set: safety, security & design space
- Where: top level
- Syntax:
security-goal Id "Title" { text "…"; answers TS-…; cal CAL3 }
| Property | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
description |
text | Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX. |
text |
text | What shall hold. |
answers |
list of threat names | The threats it answers. |
cal |
CAL1 | CAL2 | CAL3 | CAL4 |
Its CAL, when decided elsewhere. |
tags |
list of tag names | Tags. |
security-goal CSG-01 "Brake commands are authentic" { text "The brake ECU shall act only on brake commands from the ADCU."; answers TS-SPOOF }